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This  thesis  aims  to  investigate  if  the  improved  capital  regulatory  framework  implemented  by  the  Basel  
Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  has  had  any  effect  on  the  capital  adequacy  ratio  of  selected  banks.  
A  sample  of  twenty-­‐four  European  banks  was  chosen  to  represent  the  European  banking  market  as  a  
whole,  and  a  panel  data  approach  was  used.  To  evaluate  if  any  difference  occurred  between  the  time  
period   before   and   after   the   implementation,   a   multiple   regression   analysis   using   Ordinary   Least  
Squares  and  Fixed  Effects  was  carried  out.  Capital  adequacy  ratio  was  set  as  the  dependent  variable,  
and  Equity   ratio,  Net   loans  over   total  assets,  Return  on  assets,   Liquid  assets  over   total  deposits  and  
Non-­‐performing   loan   ratio   as   independent   variables.   A   dummy   variable   was   added   to   each  
independent  variable  to  distinguish  the  ratios  before  the  implementation  with  those  from  the  period  
after.  Further,  a  bank-­‐dummy  variable  for  each  bank  was  also  added  to  the  model  in  order  to  count  for  
bank-­‐specific  differences  and  to  not  let  these  bias  the  result.    
  
The   Robust   FE   result   showed   that   five   independent   variables   had   a   significant   effect   on   the   capital  
adequacy  ratio,  and  that  the  effect  has  changed  since  the   implementation  of  Basel   II.   It  also  showed  
that   the  mean  value  of   the  capital  adequacy   ratio  has   increased  by  approximately   two  percent.   The  
model  proved  that  Basel   II  has  had  a  statistically  significant  effect,  but   in  reality  this  effect  was  quite  
unpretentious  related  to  how  big  and  expensive  the   implementation  process  has  been.  We  consider  
our  regression  reliable  on  the  basis  of  an  accurate  selection  of  the  econometric  methods  used  and  a  
significant   result,   even   though   the   effect   of   Basel   II   turned   out   to   be  minor   compared   to  what   we  
expected  it  to  be.                  
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1. Introduction  
  
In  the  introduction,  the  background  to  our  thesis  will  be  presented  together  with  previous  studies  within  
the  chosen   research   field.  This   is   followed  by  a  problem  discussion  where  our   research  question  and  
hypotheses  will  be  stated.  The   last   section  will  give   the   reader  an  understanding  of   the  purpose  and  
relevance  of  this  study.    
  
1.1 Background  
  
The  main  purpose  of  a  commercial  bank   is   to  work  as  a   financial   intermediary  between   lenders  and  
borrowers.  Financial  markets  all  around  the  world  have  changed  their  shape  in  the  recent  decades  as  
the  providers  of  financial  services  have  enlarged  their  breadth  of  activities  provided  to  the  public.  At  
the   same   time,   banking   crises   have   become   increasingly   frequent  with   devastating   effects   for   both  
individuals  and  societies  (?????????????????????????2011).  This  has   led  to  the  development  of  capital  
regulations,   which   is   supposed   to   prevent   or   at   least   decrease   the   frequency   of   banking   crises   by  
prohibiting  banks   from  excessive   risk-­‐taking  behavior   (Behr,   Schmidt  &  Xie  2009).  A  common  way   to  
achieve   this   is   by   introducing   minimum   capital   requirements   that   banks   need   to   hold   as   reserves.  
These  requirements  have  been  initiated  in  different  ways  by  national  regulators,  but  have  reached  an  
international   harmonization   the   last   years   thanks   to   the   Basel   Committee   on   Banking   Supervision,  
generally  mentioned  as  Basel  I  and  Basel  II  (?????????????????????????2011).  The  Basel  Committee  on  
Banking  Supervision  was  founded   in  1974  by  the  central  banks  of   the  Group  of  Ten  countries,  G10.1  
The  Committee  seeks  to  work  as  a  forum  for  its  member  countries,  and  contribute  to  cooperation  on  
banking   supervisory   questions.   It   has   three  main  ways   to   attain   this:   by   exchanging   information   on  
national   regulations,   by   improving   techniques   for   monitoring   international   banking,   and   by   setting  
minimum   supervisory   standards.   Basel   I   from   1988   defined  what   capital   is   and   divided   it   into   core  
capital,  Tier  1,  and  supplementary  capital,  Tier  2.  Basel  I  explicitly  focused  on  credit  risk  and  required  
banks  to  hold  a  minimum  capital,  consisting  of  both  Tier  1  and  Tier  2,  of  eight  percent  of  risk-­‐weighted  
assets.   Basel   II   was   created   as   a   continuation   of   the   first   accord,   but   was   enlarged   to   also   include  
operational   risk  and  market   risk,  and   to   further   increase   the   requisitions  on  supervision  and  market  
discipline  (BCBS  2009).    
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In  recent  years,  an  extensive  number  of  reports  and  papers  have  studied  the  impact  of  harder  capital  
regulations  on  profitability,  using  different  variables  and  techniques.  A    study  done  by  Schanz,  Aikman,  
Collazos,  Frag,  Gregory  and  Kapadia  (2010)  for  the  Basel  Committee  shows  that  higher  requirements  
regarding  capital  and  liquidity  can  significantly  abate  the  probability  of  banking  crises  in  the  long  term,  
and  clearly  raise  the  security  and  soundness  of  the  global  financial  market  system.  These  benefits  are  
also  found  to  considerably  go  beyond  the  costs  of  higher  requirements  on  capital  and  liquidity.  
  
??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
This   investigation  was  based  on  yearly  data  between  2006  and  2010  from  twenty-­‐four  Turkish  banks  
and   analyzed   using   a   panel   data   approach.   Nine   bank-­‐specific   variables   were   used   with   capital  
adequacy   ratio   (CAR)   as   the   dependent   variable.   The   explanatory   variables   used   were   bank   size,  
deposits,   loans,   loan   loss   reserve,   liquidity,   profitability   (ROA   and   ROE),   net   interest   margin   and  
leverage.  Their  results  indicate  that  loans,  return  on  equity  (ROE)  and  leverage  have  a  negative  effect  
on  CAR,  and  loan  loss  reserve  and  return  on  assets  (ROA)  affect  CAR  positively.  The  remaining  variables  
bank  size,  deposits,   liquidity  and  net   interest  margin  did  not  appear  to  have  any  significant  effect  on  
CAR.      
  
Using  a  panel  data  regression  model,  Ahmad,  Ariff  and  Skully  (2008)  examined  how  banks  in  Malaysia  
set  capital  ratios  and  if  decisions  regarding  the  size  of  these  are  related  to  their  risk-­‐taking  and  changes  
in  regulatory  capital  requirements.  CAR  is  used  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  independent  variables  
were  the  following:  Non-­‐performing  loans,  a  risk  index,  a  low  capital  bank-­‐dummy,  a  year-­‐dummy,  net  
interest  margin,   total  equity   ratio,  a  dummy   for   the  year  1996,  and  total  assets.  Their   study  showed  
that  non-­‐performing  loans  and  risk  index  indicated  a  significant  correlation  between  bank  capital  and  
risk-­‐taking  behavior.    
  
??? ????? ???????? ???? ????? ???????????? ?????? ??? ????????? ??? ?????????????? and? ????????? ??????? ????
Ahmad,  Ariff  and  Skully  (2008)  will  be  used,  but  applied  to  selected  banks  in  Europe.  An  OLS  multiple  
regression   will   be   created   based   on   annual   data   between   the   years   2003-­‐2012   for   twenty-­‐four  
European  banks.  A  dummy  variable  will  be  added   to  each   independent  variable,  where   the  number  
one  indicates  a  year  after  Basel  II  was  implemented,  and  the  number  zero  if  not.  The  purpose  of  this  is  
to   capture   a   possible   difference   before   and  after   the   introduction   of   Basel   II.   To   avoid   that   internal  
differences   between   the  banks   affect   our   result,   a   bank-­‐specific   dummy   variable  was   also   added   to  
each  bank  and  the  technique  of  Fixed  Effects  was  used  (Ahmad,  Ariff  &  Skully  2008).  The  intention  for  
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this  was  to  choose  a  number  of  banks  that  together  represent  a  great  part  of  the  total  banking  market  
in   Europe,   and   therefore   can   be   seen   as   an   adequate   sample   representing   the   European   banking  
market   as   a   total.   The   question   if   higher   capital   requirements   have   had   an   impact   on   the   banking  
market  participants  is  of  high  interest  at  the  moment  partly  due  to  the  aftermath  of  the  financial  crisis  
that  began   in  2008,  but   also   since   the  Basel  Committee  has   started   the   implementation  of   an  even  
more  comprehensive  accord,  Basel  III  (BIS  2010).    
  
 
1.2 Problem discussion  
  
Previous  research  within  this  area  together  with  our  research  question  forms  the  base  of  this  thesis.  
Since   the   implementation  of   Basel   II   started   in  2007,   several   studies   have   been   done   to  evaluate   if  
improved   requirements   for   banks   have   had   any   effect   on   the  way   that   banks   handle   their   internal  
behavior  concerning  risk-­‐taking  and  capital  reserves,  and  if  so,  how  big  this  difference  is.  Even  though  
the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  has  begun   the  development  of  Basel   III,  Basel   II   is   the  
current   regulatory   framework   used   on   an   international   basis.   Member   countries   will   start  
implementing  Basel  III  2013,  but  it  will  not  be  fully  adopted  until  2019  according  to  the  present  phase-­‐
in-­‐arrangements   (BIS   2012).   Therefore,   it   is   still   of   relevance   to   evaluate   the   impact   of   Basel   II.   By  
creating  and  executing  a  regression  analysis  with  a  dummy  variable  on  each  independent  variable  and  
a  bank-­‐specific  dummy  for  each  bank,  the  ambition  is  to  capture  and  isolate  a  possible  difference  that  
can  be  derived  to  the  introduction  of  Basel  II.  This  thesis  and  its  research  question  can  thus  be  divided  
into  two  dimensions;  the  first  one   is  an  econometrical  dimension  where  the  aim  is  to  evaluate   if   the  
regression   model   shows   a   statistically   significant   result.   The   second   one   has   a   more   empirical  
approach,   as   the  purpose   is   to  discover  whether   the  Basel   II   implementation  has  had  any  effect  on  
European  banks  based  on  selected  financial  ratios.  The  following  research  question  has  been  stated:  
  
How  have  the  expanded  capital  requirements  of  Basel  II  affected  the  European  banking  market  and  its  
way  of  holding  capital  relative  to  its  risk?  
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By  doing  a  multiple  regression  with  capital  adequacy  ratio  as  the  dependent  variable  and  Return-­‐on-­‐
assets,   net   loans   over   total   assets,   liquid   assets   to   total   deposits,   equity   to   total   assets   and   non-­‐
performing   loan   ratio   as   independent   variables,   the   purpose   is   to   evaluate   if   and   how   the  
implementation  of  Basel  II  in  the  beginning  of  2007  has  had  any  measurable  effect  on  these  variables.  
Ahmad,  Ariff  and  Skully  (2008)  did  a  similar  study  on  Malaysian  banks,  and  B??????????????????????????
(2011)   on   Turkish   banks.   By   choosing   a   sample   of   data   from   banks   in   six   European   countries,   our  
intention  is  to  contribute  to  the  available  research  within  this  area,  but  from  a  European  point  of  view.  
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2. Methodology  
  
In  this  section,  a  full  presentation  of  the  methodology  used  in  this  thesis  will  be  made.  The  first  section,  
theoretical   background,   will   present   facts   about   the   Basel   Committee,   Basel   I   and   II.   This   will   be  
followed  by  a  presentation  of  the  theoretical  framework,  which  is  the  model  that  our  study  is  based  on  
and  the  data  collected.    
  
2.1 Theoretical background   
  
In   the   theoretical   background,   the   reader   will   be   given   an   introductory   description   of   the   Basel  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? its  impact  
on  the  international  banking  market.    
  
  
2.1.1 The Basel Committee 
  
The  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision,  BCBS,  was  established   in  1974  by  the  central  banks  of  
the  G10  countries  because  of  severe  disturbances  in  international  currency  and  banking  markets.  Since  
the   start,   the   aim  with   the   Committee   has   been   to   improve   the   knowledge   of   the   importance   and  
quality  of  banking   supervision  on  a   global   level.  Another  objective   is   to  provide  a   forum   for   regular  
cooperation  between  its  member  countries.  The  Committee  seeks  to  achieve  this  in  three  main  ways:  
by   exchanging   information   on   national   supervisory   arrangements,   by   improving   the   effectiveness   of  
techniques   for   supervising   international   banking   business,   and   by   creating   minimum   supervisory  
standards  in  areas  where  they  are  considered  to  be  desirable.  One  important  part  of  the  Committee?s  
work  has  been  to  close  gaps  in  international  supervisory  coverage.  The  goal  is  that  no  foreign  banking  
establishment  should  escape  from  supervision,  and  that  the  supervision  always  should  be  adequate  for  
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2.1.2 Basel I and Basel II  
  
In   recent   years,   the   Committee   has   focused   heavily   on   the   capital   adequacy   in   large   financial  
institutions.  In  the  early  years  of  the  1980s,  the  Committee  became  concerned  that  the  capital  ratios  
of   the  most   important   international   banks  were  decreasing   just  at   the   time  when   international   risks  
were   growing.   This   led   to   a   decision   to   prevent   further   decrease   of   capital   standards   and   to   start  
working   towards   larger   convergence   in   the   measurement   of   capital   adequacy.   In   1988,   The   Basel  
Committee   implemented   a   capital  measurement   system   referred   to   as   the   Basel   Capital   Accord,   or  
Basel   I.   This   system   included   a   framework  with   a  minimum   capital   ratio   of   capital   to   risk-­‐weighted  
assets,  which  all  the  G10  countries  met  at  the  end  of  1993  (BCBS  2009).  
  
The  1988  Accord  focused  mainly  on  credit  risk,  but  the  Committee  continued  its  work  to  also  include  
other   risks   in   the   framework.   In  1999,   the  Committee  proposed   a  new  capital  adequacy   framework  
that  was   supposed   to  enlarge  and  replace   the  one   from  1988.  After  a   few  years  of   refinements   the  
New  Capital  Framework,  entitled  Basel   II,  was  finally  released   in  June  2004.  Basel   II  consists  of  three  




2.1.2.1 Pillar I ? Minimum Capital Requirements 
The  first  pillar  gives  details  regarding  how  to  calculate  minimum  capital  requirements  for  credit,  market  




???? ? ???????????????  
  
Banks  are   in  general  able   to  choose  between  a  Standardized  and  an   Internal  Rating-­‐Based  Approach  
(IRB)  when   calculating   their   capital   requirements   for   credit   risk.   If   a  bank   chooses   the   Standardized  
Approach,  capital  requirements  are  calculated  based  on  credit  ratings  of  external  rating  agencies  that  
have   been   approved   by   the   Basel   Committee.   Examples   of   approved   rating   agencies   are  
??????????????s  ???????????.   If  a  bank  is  allowed  to  use  the  Internal  Rating-­‐Based  Approach,  it  can  
custom   its   own   internal   classifications   to   calculate   the   required   capital.   To   be   able   to   use   the   IRB  
Approach,   a   bank  must   receive   an   approval   from   the   supervisor   in   the   country   where   it   is   located  
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(BCBS  2004).  As  an  example,  the  Swedish  Financial  Supervisory  Authority,  Finansinspektionen,  allows  
Swedish   financial   institutions   to   choose   between   a   Standardized   Approach   and   an   Internal   Rating-­‐
Based   Approach.   Operational   risk   is   defined   as   the   risk   of   loss   as   a   result   of   inadequate   or   failed  
internal   processes,   systems,   people,   or   from   external   events.   Basel   II   gives   three   methods   for  
calculating  operational  risk:  The  Basic   Indicator  Approach,  The  Standardized  Approach  and  Advanced  
Measurement   Approaches,   AMA,   (BCBS   2004).   Concerning   market   risk,   which   is   the   risk   of   losses  
caused   by   movements   in   market   prices   and   volatilities,   Basel   II   allow   banks   to   choose   between   a  
Standardized  Approach  and  an  Internal  Model  Approach  (Dierick,  Pires,  Scheircher  &  Spitzer  2005).  
  
  
2.1.2.2 Pillar II ? Supervisory review process 
The   second  pillar   aims   to   control   that   the   capital   adequacy   position  of   a   bank   is   consistent  with   its  
overall  risk  profile,  and  can  be  seen  as  a  support  to  the  first  pillar.  It  covers  guidance  concerning  risks  
that   is   not   taken   into   account   by   the   first   pillar,   for   example   interest-­‐rate   risk   in   the   banking   book,  
business   and   strategic   risk.   If   pillar   one   can   be   considered   as   to   determine   the   minimum   level   of  
capital,  pillar  two  can  be  seen  as  a  guidance  of  a  bank's  optimal  level  of  capital  (Roberts  2008).  
  
  
2.1.2.3 Pillar III ? Market Discipline  
The   purpose   of   the   third   pillar   is   to   work   as   a   complement   to   the   first   and   second   pillar.   The  
Committee   encourages   market   discipline   by   implementing   disclosure   requirements   regarding   risk  
assessment   processes   and   capital   adequacy   of   the   institution.   A   bank's   disclosures   should   be  
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2.2 Theoretical framework   
  
In   this   section,   the  basis  of   econometrics  and  economic  data  will   be  presented.  The   focus  will   be  on  
multiple  regression  analysis  which  is  the  most  commonly  used  method  in  empirical  research  as  well  as  
the  approach  used  for  the  analysis  part.    
  
2.2.1 Regression analysis 
  
Regression   analysis   is   one   of   the   most   important   tools   within   the   econometric   field.   Generally,  
regression   is   about  describing   and  analyzing   the   relationship  between  a   certain  variable   and  one  or  
several  other  variables.  Specifically,  it  is  an  attempt  to  explain  changes  in  a  variable,  usually  called  the  
dependent   or   explained   variable,   by   reference   to   changes   in   one   or  more   variables,   usually   named  
independent  or  explanatory  variable/-­‐s.  If  the  regression  contains  only  one  independent  variable,  it  is  
called   a   simple   regression.   If   it   is   based   on   more   than   one   independent   variable,   it   is   denoted   a  
multiple  regression  (Wooldridge  2009:22-­‐23).  
  
A   simple   linear   regression   is   suitable   to   use   if   it   is   believed   that   the   dependent   variable   can   be  
explained  by  only  one  independent  variable.  This   is  a  restricted  situation  but  can  be  useful  when  for  
example   testing  a   long-­‐term  relationship  between   two  assets  prices.  The  model   for  a  perfect   simple  
regression  says  with  complete  certainty  what  the  value  of  one  variable  would  be  given  any  value  of  the  
other   variable.   This   is   not   realistic   because   it   would   in   reality   correspond   to   a   situation  where   the  
model  fitted  the  data  perfectly  and  all  observations  would  lay  exactly  on  a  straight  line.  Therefore,   in  
reality,  an  error  term  is  added  to  the  model.  The  error  term  captures  random  effects  on  the  dependent  
variable   that   cannot   be   modeled   or   missing   data   in   the   sample   (Brooks   2008:29-­‐31).   The   simple  
regression  model  has  the  following  look:  
  
? ? ?? ? ??? ? ?  
  
In   reality,   the   dependent   variable   depends   on   more   than   just   one   independent.   It   is   therefore  
appropriate   to   include   more   independent   variables   and   expand   the   simple   model   to   a   multiple  
regression  model:  
  
? ? ?? ? ???? ? ???? ??? ???? ? ?  
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By   adding  more   independent   variables,   factors   that  were   earlier   included   in   the   error   term   now   is  
included   as   independent   variables   in   the  model.   ??? ???   are   the   parameters,   or   coefficients,  which  
quantify   the  effect   that   the   independent   variables  have  on   the  dependent   variable.   Each   coefficient  
gives  a  measure  of   the  average  change   in   the  dependent  variable   for  a  one  unit  change   in  a  certain  
independent  variable.  Both  the  simple  and  the  multiple  regression  models  contain  a  constant  term,  ??,  
which  is  not  affected  by  any  independent  variable.  The  constant  term  can  be  seen  as  the  intercept,  and  
denoted  as  the  average  value  that  the  dependent  variable  would  take  if  all  the  independent  variables  
took  a  value  equal  to  zero  (Brooks  2008:88-­‐89).  
  
  
2.2.2 Characteristics of the data  
  
In  general,  there  are  three  types  of  data  that   is  suitable  when  a  quantitative  analysis   is  used  to  solve  
financial  problems:  time  series  data,  cross-­‐sectional  data  and  panel  data.  Time  series  data  are  the  ones  
that   have   been   collected   on   one   or   several   variables   over   a   period   of   time,   and   can   be   either  
quantitative  or  qualitative.  Cross-­‐sectional  data  are  data  collected  at  a  certain  point  of  time,  either  for  
one  variable  or  for  several  depending  on  the  extent  of  the  analysis  (Brooks  2008:3-­‐4).  Panel  data,  or  
longitudinal  data,  can  be  seen  as  a  combination  of   the   two  previous.   It  consists  of  a  group  of  cross-­‐
sectional   units   observed   over   two   or   more   time   periods   (Hill,   Griffiths   &   Lim   2011:538).   When  
collecting   data   for   our   quantitative   analysis,   certain   specified   cross-­‐sectional   units   are   selected   and  
they   are   observed   over   time.   This   method   of   data   collection   is   consistent   with   the   panel   data  
approach.  A  panel  dataset  should  contain  data  on  N  cases  and  over  T  time  periods,  for  a  total  of  N×T  
observations  (Hsiao,  Hammond  &  Holly  2003:14).  Applied  to  the  model  of  this  thesis,  we  have:  
  
  ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????????????        
  
In  this  case,  N>T  which  is  denoted  a  short  panel.  If  N<T,  it  is  called  a  long  panel.  This  panel  data  is  also  
what  is  called  a  balanced  panel,  which  means  that  each  cross-­‐sectional  unit  has  the  same  number  of  
observations.   If   the  panel  data   is  not  balanced,   it   is  called  unbalanced  and  each  unit  has  a  different  
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2.2.3 Estimating the regression result   
  
In   the   regression,   two   different   methods   are   used   to   interpret   the   result   from   the   multiple   linear  
regression  model;  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  and  Fixed  Effects  (FE).  
  
OLS  is  used  to  estimate  the  parameters  in  a  linear  regression  model  which  shows  how  big  impact  the  
explanatory  variables  have  on  the  explained  variable  on  average.  The  OLS  minimize  the  sum  of  squared  
residuals   for   a   population   data   set   and   create   a   fitted   value   for   each   data   point   in   the  model.   The  
residual  used   is   the  difference  between  the  real  value  of   the  dependent  value  and   its  average  value  
(Wooldridge   2009:30-­‐31).   To   assure   that   the   model   is   reliable,   several   important   assumptions   are  
stated  in  econometrics.  These  are  referred  to  as  the  Gauss-­‐Markov  Assumptions  and  if  the  regression  
model   fulfill   these   assumptions   it   is   unbiased   and   considered   as   appropriate   to   use   (Wooldridge  
2009:84-­‐87,94,104).  
  
FE   regression   is   used   in   panel   data   analysis   to   capture   omitted   variables   that   could   affect   the  
dependent  variable   in   the  model.  This   is   the  effects   that  vary  over   units  but  not  over   time.  Ahmad,  
Ariff   and   Skully   (2008)   states   that   the   FE   model   is   appropriate   to   use   in   econometrics   when   the  
number  of  units   in   the   regression   is  specified  and   the   research  result  are   limited  of   the  behavior  of  
these  units.   The  FE  regression  uses  a  different   intercept  for  each  of   the  specific  units   in   the  model,  
and  can  be  used  when  each  unit  has  data  points  for  two  or  more  years  (Stock  &  Watson  2007:356).  To  
specify   the  different   intercepts   in  our  model,   a  dummy  variable   is   created   for  each  unit.  ???   is   the  
dummy  variable  for  the  first  bank,  and  it  takes  on  the  value  one  if  it  is  the  particular  bank  and  zero  if  it  
is  not.  Next  variable  is  ???,  which  represents  the  next  bank,  and  so  on.  We  have  twenty-­‐four  banks  in  
our   regression,   and   including  a  dummy  variable   for   each  one  would   create  perfect  multicollinearity.  
This   is   also   known  as   the  dummy  variable   trap,   and   it  would  damage  our   regression.   Therefore,  we  
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2.2.4 Hypothesis testing and interpretation of the result  
  
Before  a   regression   is  done,   it   is  of   importance   to   first  set  up  hypotheses   that  states   the  aim  of   the  
test.  Two  hypotheses  is  normally  formed,  one  called  the  null  hypothesis  which  states  that  there  are  no  
statistical   significance   in   the   observations.   Before   the   test   is   done,   a   significance   level  must   also  be  
chosen.  The  significance   level   is   the  probability   that   the  null  hypothesis   is  rejected  when   it   is   in  fact  
true.  The  most  conventional  significance  level  within  finance  is  five  percent,  thus  both  ten  percent  and  
one  percent  are  used.  When  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  wrongly  something  called  Type  One  error  
arises.  Every  time  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected,  a  Type  One  error  may  have  been  made  (Hill,  Griffiths  
&  Lim  2011:102).  The  goal  is  to  either  reject  or  accept  the  null  hypothesis.  To  be  able  to  reject  the  null  
hypothesis,  the  regression  must  show  that  there  occurs  statistical  significance  between  the  variables  
that  were  selected  for  the  test.  If  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected,  an  alternative  hypothesis  is  accepted  
instead   which   indicates   that   the   regression   analysis   have   shown   that   there   occur   a   statistically  
significance  between  the  dependent  and  independent  variable/-­‐s.  Hypothesis  testing  is  usually  used  to  
apply  a  sample  result  of  a  hypothesis  test  to  a  whole  population,  or  to  determine  if  the  mean  value  of  
a  population   is   the  same  as   the  mean  value  of   the  sample  that  were  tested.  (Wooldridge  2009:120-­‐
122).  
  
To  test  whether  an  estimated  coefficient   is  statistically  significant  or  not,  a  t-­‐test  is  used.  A  t-­‐value   is  
calculated   by   the   estimated   coefficient   and   its   error   term.   This   calculated   value   is   compared   to   the  
chosen   significance   level   and   if   the   t-­‐value   for   the   estimated   coefficient   is   more   positive   or   more  
negative  than  the  critical  t-­‐value  the  coefficient  is  statistically  significant  at  this  point.  If  this  conclusion  
is  reached,  we  can  reject  the  null  hypothesis.  There  are  two  different  tests  that  could  be  made  by  t-­‐
statistics.   The   first   one   is   the   One-­‐Sided   test   and   it   is   used   when   the   relationship   between   the  
dependent  and  independent  variable  is  known  to  be  either  positive  or  negative  (Wooldridge  2009:122-­‐
123).  The  second   test   is   called  Two-­‐Sided  Alternative  and   is  used  when   the  alternative  hypothesis   is  
not   specifically   determined   (Wooldridge   2009:128).   The   significance   test   using   p-­‐value   is   useful   to  
determine   the   lowest   significance   level  where   the   null   hypothesis   can   be   rejected.   The   p-­‐value   is   a  
probability  measure  and  because  of  that  it  always  takes  on  a  value  between  zero  and  one.  The  stated  
significance   level   is  compared  to  the  calculated  p-­‐value  and   if  the  p-­‐value   is  below  this   level  the  null  
hypothesis  are  rejected.  The  calculation  of  the  p-­‐value  requires  detailed  t-­‐statistics  tables  but  many  of  
the  regressions  data  programs  calculate  the  p-­‐value  when  the  OLS  regression  is  made.  The  calculation  
is   based   on   the   area   under   the   probability   density   function   in   the   t-­‐distribution   (Wooldridge  
 
 
THE IMPACT OF BASEL II REGULATION IN THE 




2009:133).   F-­‐statistics   are   used   for   testing   the   overall   significance   or   for   a   chosen   group   of  
independent   variables   when   the   other   variables   already   have   been   tested   in   a   regression   model.  
Compared  to  the  t-­‐statistics,  which  test  if  a  single  variable  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  dependent  
variable,  the  F-­‐value  tests  the  jointly  significance  of  all  the  chosen  variables.  The  hypothesis   in  the  F-­‐
test  is  built  up  on  a  null  hypothesis  which  says  that  none  of  the  independent  variables  have  an  effect  
on   the   variable   tested   for.   The   alternative   hypothesis   for   an   F-­‐test   says   that   at   least   one   of   the  
explanatory  variables  has  an  effect  on  the  dependent  variable  (Wooldridge  2009:134).  When  making  a  
test  for  a  group  of  the  independent  variable  the  regression  model  is  called  restricted.  The  calculation  
of   the   F-­‐value   shows   the   increase   in   sum   of   squared   residuals   when  moving   from   a   non-­‐restricted  
model   to   a   restricted   one.   This   F-­‐value   is   compared   to   the   F-­‐statistics   and   the   critical   value   at   the  




2.2.5 Possible problems in a regression model  
  
A  number  of  common  but  undesired  outcomes  that  might  affect  the  usefulness  of  a  linear  regression  
model   occur.   This   section   is   focusing  on   two  of   these   possible   outcomes,  namely  heteroskedasticity  
and  multicollinearity.    
  
Heteroskedasticity  appears  in  a  regression  model  when  the  variance  of  the  error  term,  conditional  on  
the  explanatory  variables,  is  not  constant.  The  problem  with  heteroskedasticity  is  that  the  usual  t-­‐  and  
F-­‐statistics   becomes   unreliable   and   this   problem   is   not   corrected   with   a   large   sample   of   data.   The  
heteroskedasticity   do   not   affect   the   coefficient   of   determination   and   causes   no   biasness   in   the  
regression.   A   method   for   making   an   OLS   regression   with   heteroskedasticity   a   useful   model   is   to  
estimate   the   robust  standard  errors   (Wooldridge  2009:264-­‐265).  These  adjusted  standard  errors  are  
often  referred   to  as  White,  Huber  or  Eicker  standard  errors   in  econometrics   (Wooldridge  2009:267).  
The   calculations   of   the   robust   standard   errors   are   advanced   but   most   of   the   statistical   software  
packages  are  calculating  it.  When  the  robust  errors  are  computed,  the  t-­‐  and  F-­‐test  can  be  calculated  
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Multicollinearity  arises  when  the  independent  variables  in  the  regression  model  are  strongly  correlated  
with  each  other.   If   two   independent   variables   are  highly   correlated,   they  basically   communicate   the  
same  information  and  one  should  be  removed.  The  test  can  then  show  that  a  variable  is  insignificant  
when   it   is   in  reality  significant  (Hill,  Griffiths  &  Lim  2012:240-­‐241).  Multicollinearity  can  be  tested  by  
calculating   the   variance   inflation   factor,   VIF.   This   provides   a   measure   of   the   austerity   of   the  
multicollinearity  in  an  OLS  regression  analysis,  and  how  much  the  variance  of  a  coefficient  is  increased  
because  of   collinearity.   If   any  of   the  VIFs   surpass   five  or   ten,   it   is  an   indication   that  multicollinearity  
exist  in  the  model  (Montgomery,  Peck  &  Vining  2012:117-­‐118,  296).  
  
  
2.3 Dependent variable - Capital Adequacy Ratio   
  
Capital   Adequacy   Ratio,   CAR,   is   a   measure   where   the   capital   of   the   bank   is   related   to   different  
categories   of   risk   exposures.   The   numerator   of   CAR   contains   Tier   1   and   Tier   2   capital.   The   Tier   1  
includes   equity   capital,   retained   earnings   and   non-­‐cumulative   preference   shares.   This   is   the   most  
important  reserves  against  losses  in  the  bank  on  current  basis  and   it  is  also  an  important  measure  of  
??????   ability   to  manage   risk   (Van  Greuning  &  Brajovic  Bratanovic  2009:127-­‐128).  The  equity   capital  
and   the   retained   earnings   are   defined   as   Core   Capital.   According   to   the   Basel   Committee,   the   Core  
Capital  is  the  most  important  part  of  a  bank's  capital  because  it  is  completely  reported  in  the  financial  
statement.   Further,   it   does   not   differ   between   different   countries   accounting   systems.   Many  
assess?????????????????  performance  and  adequacy  are  calculated  using  the  Core  Capital  (BCBS  1988).    
  
Tier   2   capital   includes   General   provisions/loss   reserves,   debt/equity   capital   instruments   and  
subordinated  term  dept.  Asset  revaluation  reserves  can  also  be  included  if  they  are  carefully  assessed  
and   totally   reflects   the  possible  price   fluctuation  or   compelling   sales.  Tier  2   is  not  classified  as  Core  
Capital  but  is  still  used  to  assess  the  capital  adequacy  of  a  bank.  Tier  2  is  based  on  capital  obligations  
that  will   bring   a   future   income   but   have   a  mandatory   fee,   or   that   finally  would   be   redeemed.   This  
capital  may  not  exceed  100  percent  of   the  Tier  1  capital   (Van  Greuning  &  Brajovic  Bratanovic  2009:  
129).    
  
The  Tier  1  capital  and  Tier  2  capital  together  is  defined  as  the  Regulatory  Capital  and  to  calculate  CAR  
the   this   capital   is   divided   by   the   bank`s   risk-­‐weighted   assets.   The   risk-­‐weighted   assets   have   three  
components:  credit  risk,  market  risk  and  operational  risk.  These  three  risk  components  are  weighted  
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into  different  probabilities  of  default  either  by  a  Standardized  Approach  or  an  Internal  risk  model  (Van  
Greuning  &  Brajovic  Bratanovic  2009:130-­‐131).  The  calculation  which  includes  different  types  of   risk-­‐




?????????? ? ??????????????? ? ???  
 
 
2.4 Independent variables 
 
2.4.1 Equity Ratio ? EQTA 
  
The  equity  ratio  is  a  financial  ratio  over  the  proportions  of  equity  applied  to  finance  the  total  assets.  
This   ratio   gives   an   indicative   about   the   solvency   position   that   the   bank   holds.   A   low   equity   ratio  
indicates   a   high   leverage   and   because   of   that   a   higher   risks   (Kandil   &  Naceur   2007:77).   For   banks,  
financial  ratios  focusing  on  equity  is  of  great  importance.  High  equity  implies  that  the  bank  hold  more  
liquid  capital  for  example  future  expansions  or  dividends  to   its  shareholders.  Equity  and  reserves  are  
expensive  since  it  does  not  generate  any  income,  so  it  is  always  a  consideration  between  holding  liquid  
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2.4.2 Net Loans over Total Assets - NLTA  
  
Net   loans  over   total  assets   is  a   liquidity   ratio   that  gives  a  measure  of   the  part  of   total  assets   that   is  
fixed   in   loans.   The   greater   this   ratio   is   the   greater   is   the   part   of   total   assets   that   consists   of   loans  
(Bankscope).   This   indicates   a   less   liquid   company.   There   is   a   risk   of  having   a   great   amount   of   loans  
relative  to  total  assets,  because  it  takes  longer  time  to  transform  loans  into  liquid  resources  compared  
with  other  forms  of  assets.  By  having  a  big  part  of  the  assets  bounded  in   loans,  the  risk  of   illiquidity  




???????????? ? ???  
 
 
2.4.3 Return on Assets - ROA 
  
ROA  is  a  profitability  measure  which  indicates  how  well  the  bank  performs  relative  to  its  full  potential.  
The  total  after  tax  income  is  divided  by  the  total  assets.  The  ROA  indicates  how  well  a  bank  is  managed  
because  it  shows  how  much  profit  it  makes  on  average  per  unit  of  asset  (Eakins  &  Mishkin  2012:451).  
ROA  is  an  often  used  measure  since  it  allows  comparison  between  banks  of  different  sizes  because  the  




???????????? ? ???  
  
  
2.4.4 Liquid Assets to Total Deposits - LATD  
  
A  common  way  to  express  liquidity  risk  is  liquid  assets  over  total  debt  and  borrowing.  This  shows  the  
capacity  of  the  bank  to  pay  their  debt  without  taking  new  loans  or  raise  equity  capital.  A  low  liquidity  
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2.4.5 Non-Performing Loan Ratio - NPL 
  
NPL  is  a  measure  of  default  risk  where  the  impaired  loans  in  a  bank`s  loan  portfolio  is  divided  by  the  
total  loans  in  the  bank.  NPL  is  often  used  to  investigate  how  big  credit  risk  exposure  the  bank  is  facing  
and   this   ratio   is   used   in  many  working  papers   as   a   risk  measure.  An   impaired   loan  appears  when  a  
borrower  fails  to  pay  his  obligations,  interest  or  principal  payments  over  a  ninety  days  period  (Ahmad,  
Ariff  &   Skully   2008).   The  non-­‐performing   loan   ratio   is  most   likely  positively   correlated  with  a  bank`s  




??????????? ? ???        
2.4.6 Dummy variables for implementation of Basel II and bank-specific effects 
  
A   dummy   variable   is   an   independent   variable   that   takes   on   the   value   one   or   zero,   and   is   used   to  
indicate   the   absence   or   presence   of   a   categorical   effect   that   might   change   the   outcome   of   the  
regression.  To  evaluate  if  any  difference  occur  between  the  years  before  and  after  the  implementation  
of  Basel  II,  a  dummy  variable  is  added  to  the  regression  model.  This  is  used  to  categorize  data  from  the  
years  before  the  implementation  of  Basel  II  in  the  beginning  of  2007,  and  the  years  after.  Data  from  a  
year  when  Basel   II  has  already  been   implemented   is   labeled  one   in  SPSS,  and  data  before   is   labeled  
zero   (Wooldridge   2009:225-­‐226).   For   the   FE   regression,   the   model   was   expanded   to   also   include  
twenty-­‐three  bank-­‐specific  dummy  variables.  The  purpose  of   these   is   to  capture   firm-­‐specific  effects  
that  might  exist  in  the  model.  The  bank-­‐dummies  are  programmed  in  the  same  way  in  SPSS,  were  the  
dummy  takes  on  the  value  one  for  the  particular  ?????s  data  points  and  zero  otherwise.  This  gives  all  
specific   banks,   besides   one  which   are   used   as   benchmark,   an   own   coefficient   and   capture   omitted  
effects  in  the  regression  (Stock  &  Watson  2007:356).  225-­‐226).  
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2.5 The model  
  
When  the  dependent  and  the   independent  variables  are  put  together,   the  regression  models  can  be  
created.  These  are  used  in  the  analysis  as  a  tool  to  answer  the  hypotheses  and  the  research  question.  
The  OLS  regression  model  gets  the  following  look:    
  
??? ? ?? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ???????? ? ???????? ? ???????? ? ????? ? ???????? ? ???? ?
???????? ? ???? ? ????????? ? ???? ? ???(?????? ? ???)??????????? ? ???? ? ???    
  
And  with  the  bank-­‐specific  effects  added,  the  FE  model  is  formed  as:  
  
??? ? ?? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ???????? ? ???????? ? ???????? ? ????? ? ???????? ? ???? ?
???????? ? ???? ? ????????? ? ???? ? ???(?????? ? ???)??????????? ? ???? ? ????? ? ????? ? ??
??????? ? ???  
  
??  ?  Bank  specific  dummy  variable  for  time  t    
???  ?  Basel  II  dummy  variable  for  bank  i  at  time  t  
?????  ?  Capital  Adequacy  Ratio  for  bank  i  at  time  t    
?????    -­‐  Return-­‐on-­‐assets  for  bank  i  at  time  t  
?????    ?  Non-­‐performing  loans  for  bank  i  at  time  t  
??????    ?  Total  equity  over  total  assets  for  bank  i  at  time  t  
??????    ?  Net  loans  over  total  assets  for  bank  i  at  time  t  
??????  ?  Liquid  assets  to  total  deposits  for  bank  i  at  time  t  
???   ?  Error  term  for  bank  i  at  time  t  
  
All   the   independent   variables   are   tested  both   separately  with   a   t-­‐test   and   together   using   an   F-­‐test.  
Before  the  regressions  were  executed,  the  following  two  hypotheses  were  stated  for  the  F-­‐test;  
  
??  -­‐  The  independent  variables  have  no  statistically  significant  effect  on  bank's  Capital  Adequacy  Ratio.    
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3. Data  
  
In  this  section,  a  short  explanation  of  the  data  and  program  used  will  be  given.  Expected  directions  and  
a  summary  statistics  will  also  be  presented  here  to  give  the  reader  a  broader  understanding  of  the  data  
sample  before  the  regression  is  done.  
  
3.1 Description of the data 
  
The  data  is  collected  annually  between  the  years  2003-­‐2012  from  the  four  biggest  banks  in  each  of  the  
following  countries:  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Spain,  Sweden  and  United  Kingdom.  The  reason  why  these  
countries   are   used   is   because   they   together   represent   a   large   part   of   the   total   banking  market   in  
Europe.  All  the  banks  are  commercial  and  listed  on  an  exchange,  and  our  ambition  is  that  the  sample  
result   will   be   applicable   to   the   banking   market   in   Europe   as   a   whole.   All   the   data   collected   are  
expressed  in  percent,  which  helps  to  reduce  the  problem  caused  by  the  fact  that  the  banks  used  are  of  
different  sizes.    
  
The   reason  why  annual  data   is  used   instead  of  quarterly  or  monthly,  which  would  have  provided  us  
with  a  larger  sample,  is  because  we  thought  that  many  financial  decisions  that  banks  take  are  on  yearly  
basis.  They  might  take  financial  decisions  that  are  not  meant  to  be  shown  in  the  result  before  the  end  
of  the  year  due  to  time  lags  in  the  implementation  processes.  Further,  it  is  much  easier  to  find  annual  
data  ten  years  back  in  time  compared  with  monthly  data  which  is  not  always  stated.  Because  of  this,  
we  thought  that  yearly  data  were  the  most  adequate  to  use  for  the  aim  of  our  analysis.    
  
All   the  data  has  been  collected   from  the  databases  Bankscope  and  Orbis,  which  both  are   frequently  
used  worldwide.  We  consider  these  sources  trustworthy  as  they  are  public  and  available  for  everyone  
so  any  person  who  intends  to  collect  the  same  numbers  as  we  have  done  can  do  so  by  using  the  same  
sources.  All  the  banks  are  using  standardized  accounting  systems  accepted  by  International  Accounting  
Standards,   IAS,   and   International   Financial   Reporting   Standards,   IFRS,   for   exchange   listed   companies  
(2002/1606/EC).  All  the  numbers  are  also  calculated  at  least  twice  to  minimize  the  risk  of  errors  caused  
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The   choice   of   variables   for   the   regression   analysis   was   based   on   earlier   studies   within   the   same  
research  area  as  this  one.  Several  authors  have  used  CAR  as  the  dependent  variable   in  their  studies.  
The  same   is  valid  for   the   independent  variables,  which  are  all   frequently  used  ratios  both   in  finance  
and  accounting  as  measures  of  stability  or  profitability  (??????????????&?????????  2011;  Ahmad,  Ariff  &  
Skully  2008;  Banarjee  2012).  
  
  
3.2 Description of the program used  
  
The  statistical  program  SPSS  was  used  for  the  regression.  SPSS  is  a  broadly  used  program  for  statistical  
surveys,   and   the   reliability   of   it   has   been   proved   by  many   researchers   before.  We   have   used   both  
course  books  and  articles  that  describe  how  to  use  the  program  in  the  best  suitable  way.  We  have  also  
done   a   correlation   (Table   5)   to   see   that   there   is   no   multicollinearity   between   the   independent  
variables  used.    
  
  
3.3 Expected direction of the independent variables 
  
Independent  variable     Predicted  sign     References              
Return  on  assets  (ROA)   +   ????????????????????????????????????  
Non-­‐performing  loan  ratio  (NPL)   +  /  -­‐   Ahmad  et  al.  (2008:262)  
  Equity  ratio  (EQTA)   +   Kandil,  Naceur  (2007:77)  
  Net-­‐loans  over  total  assets  (NLTA)   -­‐   ????????????????????????????????????  
Liquid  assets  to  total  deposits  (LATD)   +   Ahmad  et  al.  (2008:263)       
Table  1.  Expected  direction  of  the  independent  variables  
  
ROA  is  a  measure  of  profitability,  and   is  expected  to  be  positively  related  to  CAR.  We  believe  that  a  
bank   in   general   need   to   increase   its   asset   risks   in  order   to   increase   returns,  but  earlier   studies  has  
shown  that  more  capitalized  banks  tend  to  raise  higher  profits  and  therefore  these  two  measures  are  
expected  to  be  positively  related  to  each  other  (???????????????  ????????  2011).  NPL  measures  credit  
or  default  risk,  and  we  first  thought  it  would  have  a  negative  relation  with  CAR.  Higher  risk  exposures  
most  likely  affect  risk-­‐weighted  assets  negatively  and  therefore  should  have  a  negative  impact  on  CAR.  
It  has  been  hard  to  find  any  previous  studies  which  declare  a  clear  direction  of  the  outcome  of  the  NPL  
impact  on  CAR.  We  therefore  believe  it  to  have  either  a  positive  or  negative  impact  on  CAR  (Ahmad,  
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Ariff  &  Skully  2008).  EQTA  is  expected  to  be  positively   related  to  CAR,  because  an   increased  equity-­‐
ratio  affects  Tier  1  and  Tier  2  and  therefore  increase  CAR  in  a  positive  direction.  Higher  equity  to  asset  
ratio   indicates  a   lower   leverage  and   less   risky  bank   (Kandil  &  Naceur  2007).  NLTA   is  predicted   to  be  
negatively  related  to  CAR  because  increased  loans  are  expected  to  increase  the  riskiness  of  the  bank's  
assets   (?????????????  &  ????????   2011).   LATD  might  be  positively   related   to  CAR  because  as   capital  
regulations  increases,  the  harder  is  the  requirements  to  hold  a  greater  share  of  liquid  assets  (Ahmad,  
Ariff  &  Skully  2008).  
  
  
3.4 Descriptive statistics  
  
Table   2   shows   descriptive   statistics  with   number   of   observations,  minimum,  maximum,  mean   value  
and  standard  deviation  for  the  total  period  of  data.  Table  3  show  descriptive  statistics  but  for  both  the  
period  before   and   the  period   after   Basel   II  was   implemented.   As   seen   in   the   table,   there   are   some  
smaller  differences  between  the  two  periods  and  these  will  be  interpreted  further  in  the  analysis.    
  
Independent  variable     Obs     Mean     Std.  Dev   Min     Max    
Capital  Adequacy  Ratio  (CAR)   231   0,1223   0,02447   0,0810   0,2121  
Return  on  Assets  (ROA)   235   0,0040   0,00444   -­‐0,0195   0,0147  
Non-­‐performing  loan  ratio  (NPL)   225   0,0353   0,02780   0,0017   0,1670  
Equity  over  total  assets  (EQTA)   236   0,0456   0,01607   0,0108   0,0987  
Net-­‐loans  over  total  assets  (NLTA)   236   0,4859   0,17513   0,1033   0,8093  
Liquid  assets  to  total  deposits  (LATD)   236   0,2790   0,13433   0,0499   0,7279  




Before  implementation     After  implementation    
Independent  variable     Obs   Mean     Std.  Dev   Obs     Mean     Std.Dev  
Capital  Adequacy  Ratio  (CAR)   115   0,1113   0,0167   116   0,1331   0,0261  
Return  on  Assets  (ROA)   119   0,0056   0,0037   116   0,0022   0,0045  
Non-­‐performing  loan  ratio  (NPL)   110   0,0238   0,0196   115   0,0462   0,0301  
Equity  over  total  assets  (EQTA)   120   0,0445   0,0164   116   0,0468   0,0157  
Net-­‐loans  over  total  assets  (NLTA)   120   0,4853   0,1751   116   0,4866   0,1759  
Liquid  assets  to  total  deposits  (LATD)   120   0,3073   0,1535   116   0,2497   0,1038  
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This   section   will   start   with   a   presentation   of   the   model   used   for   the   regression,   continued   by   the  
complete  results  of  the  regressions.    
  
4.1 Model Approach  
  
As   in  previous   studies  by  ?????????????? ????????????? ?????)   and  Ahmad,  Ariff   and  Skully   (2008)  we  
chose   to  have  Capital  Adequacy  Ratio  as   the  dependent  variable.  The  aim  with   this   is   to   investigate  
how   higher   capital   regulations   affect   how   banks   hold   capital   relative   to   its   risk.   Five   independent  
variables  were  chosen:  ROA  as  a  profitability  measure  in  line  with  ?????????????  and  Abdio??????2011)  
model,  NPL  as  proxy   for   the   level  of   risk-­‐exposure  as  Ahmad,  Ariff  and  Skully   (2008),   and  EQTA  as  a  
measure  of  financial  strength  as  used  by  Kandil  and  Naceur  (2007).  In  Kandil  and  Naceurs  (2007)  report  
this  variable  is  labeled  Capratio  but  express  the  same  ratio.  NLTA  is  used  as  a  risk  measure  for  the  loan  
portfolio  and  NLTD  as  liquidity  measure  but  in  their  report  they  name  the  variable  LACSF  (Ahmad,  Ariff  
&   Skully   2008).   We   also   chose   to   include   a   Basel   II   dummy   which   aims   to   capture   the   difference  
between  the  two  time  periods  (Ahmad,  Ariff  &  Skully  2008).  Before  the  regression  was  executed,  the  
model   was   tested   to   reveal   if   correlation   or   multicollinearity   existed   in   the   independent   variables  
(Büy??????????  &  ?????????????).  This  was  accomplished  to  prove  that  the  model  was  qualified  as  an  
unbiased  OLS  regression  model  and  therefore  reliable.  Then  the  OLS  regression  was  done  using  a  panel  
data  approach  just  as  Ahmad,  Ariff  and  Skully  (2008)  and  Kandil  and  Naceur  (2007).  We  included  five  
interaction-­‐terms,   which   are   the   main   variables   multiplied   with   the   Basel   II   dummy   to   show   the  
difference   in   the   slope   coefficient   before   and   after   Basel   II   regulation   (Wooldridge   2009:225-­‐226).  
Twenty-­‐three  bank-­‐specific  dummy  variables  were  also  included  to  count  for  bank-­‐specific  effects.  The  
technique   for   FE   is   the   same   as   for   the   standard  OLS   regression   but  with   these   extra   bank-­‐specific  
variables.   To   adjust   for   a   possible  heteroskedasticity  problem   in   the  model,   the   FE  model  was  used  
which  estimated  the  robust  standard  errors  with  the  generalized  least  squares  function  in  SPSS  (Stock  
&  Watson  2007:356).  
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4.1.1 Variance inflation factor and correlation 
  
Before  the  regression,   the  model  was   tested  for  multicollinearity.  The  result   from  SPSS  show  that   all  
variables  have  a  variance  inflation  factor,  VIF,  that  is  between  one  and  three.  The  result  indicates  that  
the  independent  variables  are  weakly  correlated  with  each  other,  and  there  is  no  need  to  change  any  
of  the  variables  in  the  regression  model.    
  
Multicollinearity    
Independent  variable   Tolerance   VIF  
ROA   0,560   1,785  
NPL   0,546   1,833  
EQTA   0,494   2,023  
NLTA   0,334   2,995  
LATD     0,411   2,433  
Table  4.  Multicollinearity  
  
Table   5   shows   a   correlation   matrix   to   get   a   summary   of   the   correlation   between   all   the   variables  
(Büy??????????   &   ????????   2011).   The   correlation   matrix   discovers   that   none   of   the   variables   are  
perfectly  correlated  with  each  other.  The  highest  correlation  is  between  the  variables  NLTA  and  LATD  
which   are  negative   correlated  by   -­‐0.759.  None  of   the   independent   variable   has   a  higher   correlation  
than  0.253  against  the  dependent  variable.  
  
     CAR     ROA   NPL   EQTA   NLTA   LATD  
CAR   1  
              ROA   -­‐0,175   1  
           NPL   0,253   -­‐0,479   1  
        EQTA   0,055   0,284   0,289   1  
     NLTA   -­‐0,223   0,249   -­‐0,042   0,532   1  
  LATD   0,162   -­‐0,033   -­‐0,057   -­‐0,382   -­‐0,759   1  
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4.1.2 Results of the OLS regression 
  
The  OLS  regression  output  (Table  7)  shows  that  two  of  the  independent  variables  are  significant.  These  
are   ROA   and   the   interaction-­‐term   ROA_Basel2,   which   are   significant   at   the   ten   percent   and   five  
percent  levels  respectively.  ROA  has  a  positive  relation  to  CAR  with  a  slope  coefficient  of  1.286  and  the  
interaction-­‐term  has  a  negative  outcome  of  -­‐1.85.  This  means  that  the  relationship  between  ROA  and  
CAR   has   changed   between   the   two   periods,   before   and   after   the   Basel   II   implementation.   The  
relationship  was  positive  the  first  period  but  then  showed  a  negative  relationship  the  period  after.  All  
the   other   independent   variables,   including   the   Basel2   dummy   variable,   are   statistically   insignificant.  
Three  of  our  main  variables  in  the  model  are  positively  related  to  CAR,  these  are  ROA,  NPL  and  LATD.  
EQTA  and  NLTA  both  have  negative  coefficients  in  the  OLS  regression  but  it  is  only  ROA  that  is  reliable  
statistically  measured.  The  F-­‐test  demonstrates  a  high  overall  significance  in  the  model  with  a  value  of  
9.245.  The  R-­‐squared  of  the  OLS  regression  is  0.324  which  mean  that  the  independent  variables  in  our  
model  can  explain  32.4  percent  of  CAR.  The  full  SPSS  regression  outcome  is  attached  as  Appendix  1.  
  
  
4.1.3 Results of the FE regression 
  
The  FE  regression  result,  where  a  dummy  variable  was  included  for  every  specific  bank,  turned  out  to  
be  different  compared  to  the  OLS.  The  output  now  includes  five  significant  variables  and  three  of  them  
are   significant   at   the   one  percent   level.   Three   of   our  main   variables   are   significant;   ROA,   EQTA   and  
LATD.  ROA  was  significant  at  the  ten  percent  in  the  OLS  regression  and  now  at  the  five  percent  level.  
The   beta   coefficient   appears   to   be   larger   in   the   FE   model   by   0.246   percentage   points.   The   ROA  
coefficient  is  positive  and  this  result  was  also  found  by  Büy???????????????????????  (2011)  as  they  got  a  
positive   significant   relation   between   ROA   and   CAR.   Kandil   and  Naceur   (2007)   also   found   a   positive  
significant   relationship  between  ROA  and  CAR.  EQTA,  which  goes   from  being   insignificant   in   the  OLS  
regression  to  be  significant  in  the  FE  estimation,  also  changed  sign  on  the  coefficient  from  a  negative  -­‐
0.012  to  a  positive  0.715.  The  positive  relation  between  CAR  and  EQTA  was  explained  by  Kandil  and  
Naceur  (2007)  as  a  possible  proxy  for  capital  adequacy.  Ahmad,  Ariff  and  Skully  (2008)  included  EQTA  
in  the  calculation  of  their  Z-­‐score  variable  which  is  a  risk  index  were  EQTA  is  present  to  show  how  well  
the  bank  can  handle  unexpected  losses.  Even  though  they  used  this  variable  as  part  of  their  Z-­‐score,  it  
could   explain   a   positive   relation   between   EQTA   and   CAR   even   in   our   model.   The   third   significant  
variable  is  LATD;  this  variable  has  both  a  positive  coefficient  and  a  positive  effect  on  CAR.  When  LATD  
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increased  by  one  unit,  CAR  increases  by  0.053  percentage  points.  This  result  is  in  the  same  direction  as  
Ahmad,  Ariff  and  Skully  (2008),  as  they  found  that  the  variable  named  LACSF  indicated  a  positive  effect  
on  CAR.  
  
Two   of   the   interaction   terms,   ROA_Basel2   and   LATD_Basel2,   are   significant.   The   ROA_Basel2   is  
significant  at  the  one  percent  level.  It  has  a  negative  sign  which  imply  that  the  impact  that  ROA  has  on  
CAR  has  decreased  since  the  implementation  of  Basel  II.  The  slope  coefficient  for  ROA  when  the  Basel  
II  framework  is  implemented  goes  from  positive  1.532  to  negative  -­‐0.816  in  our  model.  LATD_Basel2  is  
positive  and  significant  at  the  ten  percent  level,  which  indicates  that  LATD  has  a  bigger  effect  on  CAR  
after   the   implementation  of   the  Basel   II   compared  with   the  period  before.  When  LATD   increases  by  
one   percentage   point,   CAR   increases   by   0.104   instead   of   0.053   as   in   the   period   before.   The  
calculations   in  table  6  show  how  the  slope  coefficients   in  the  model  have  changed  since  the  Basel   II  
implementation.  The  model  is  highly  significant  according  to  the  F-­‐test  with  a  value  of  15.466.  The  R-­‐
squared  is  0.736  which  indicates  that  the  independent  variables  together  explain  73.6  percent  of  the  
dependent.  The  full  output  of  the  FE  regression  in  SPSS  is  attached  as  appendix  2.    
  
  
         
ROA   1,532+(-­‐2,348)=   -­‐0,816  
NPL   (-­‐0,017)+0,054=   0,037  
EQTA   0,715+(-­‐0,096)=   0,619  
NLTA   (-­‐0,019)+0,009=   -­‐0,01  
LATD     0,053+0,051=   0,104  
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Independent  variable     Dependent  variable:  Capital  adequacy  ratio  (CAR)       
     
OLS    
     
FE  
               Beta     T-­‐value          Beta     T-­‐value       
Intercept    
  
0,098   5,975  
  
0,059   3,757  
  ROA    
  
1,286   1,78   *   1,532   2,886   ***  
NPL  
  
0,195   1,631  
  
-­‐0,017   -­‐0,16  
  EQTA  
  
-­‐0,012   -­‐0,061  
  
0,715   4,373   ***  
NLTA  
  
-­‐0,012   -­‐0,566  
  
-­‐0,019   -­‐0,833  
  LATD  
  
0,025   1,103  
  
0,053   3,04   ***  
ROA_Basel2   -­‐1,85   -­‐2,072   **   -­‐2,348   -­‐3,603   ***  
NPL_Basel2   -­‐0,211   -­‐1,398  
  
0,054   0,463  
  EQTA_Basel2   0,357   1,313  
  
-­‐0,096   -­‐0,461  
  NLTA_Basel2   -­‐0,004   -­‐0,145  
  
0,009   0,453  
  LATD_Basel2   0,061   1,606  
  
0,051   1,835   *  
Basel2  
  
0,007   0,314  
  
0,018   1,158  
  R-­‐squared          0,324        0,736       
***,  **  ,  *  Significant  at  the  1%,  5%  and  10%  level.    
           Table  7.  Regression  result  from  OLS  and  FE    
  
  
4.1.4 Results of the Robust FE Regression  
  
As   the   test   for  heteroskedasticity   indicated   that   there   could  have  occurred  heteroskedasticity   in   the  
model,   it  was  appropriate   to  also  do   the  regression  with   robust  standard  errors.  The  FE  with  robust  
standard  errors  (Table  8)  gives  a  result  quite  similar  to  the  normal  FE.  The  exceptions  are  that  ROA  now  
is  significant  at  the  five  percent  level  instead  of  one  percent,  and  that  LATD_Basel2  now  is  significant  at  
the  five  percent  level  compared  with  the  standard  FE  where  it  was  significant  only  at  ten  percent.  The  
rest  of   the  coefficients  show  the  same  outcome  regardless   if   they  are   significant  or  not.  EQTA,  LATD  
and  ROA_Basel2   are   all   significant   at   the  one  percent   level,   and   the   rest  of   the   coefficients   are  not  
significant   at   all.   The   R-­‐squared   is   the   same   as   for   the   standard   FE,   0.736,  which   indicates   that   the  
independent  variables  together  explain  approximately  74  percent  of  the  value  of  CAR.  Even  though  the  
result  of  FE  robust  show  a  small  difference  compared  to  the  standard  FE  it  is  motivated  to  use  because  
heteroskedasticity  might,  if  not  taken  into  account,  seriously  affect  the  reliability  of  the  test  results  in  a  
negative  way.  Some  of  the  bank-­‐specific  variables  were  statistically  significant  in  the  regression  result.  
Thus,  they  all  showed  beta  values  that  was  too  small  to  be  relevant  for  an  analysis.  Therefore,  we  will  
not  analyze  these  variables  further  within  the  frame  of  this  thesis.  The  full  Robust  FE  regression  with  all  
the  banks  represented  is  presented  as  Appendix  3,  and  the  test  for  heteroskedasticity  as  Appendix  4.  
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Independent  variable     Beta   Std.Error   Sign.level       
Intercept     0,059   0,0152   0,000  
  ROA     1,532   0,676   0,023   **  
NPL   -­‐0,017   0,1207   0,888  
  EQTA   0,715   0,2154   0,001   ***  
NLTA   -­‐0,019   0,0229   0,417  
  LATD   0,053   0,0157   0,001   ***  
ROA_Basel2   -­‐2,348   0,7807   0,003   ***  
NPL_Basel2   0,054   0,1221   0,661  
  EQTA_Basel2   -­‐0,096   0,227   0,672  
  NLTA_Basel2   0,009   0,021   0,653  
  LATD_Basel2   0,051   0,0238   0,033   **  
Basel2   0,018   0,0138   0,185       
***,  **,  *  significant  at  the  1%,  5  %  and  10  %  level  
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The   descriptive   statistics   (Table   3)   that   declare   the   differences   between   the   two   periods   covered  
indicate  that  CAR  has   increased  by  2.18  percent  since  the   implementation  of  Basel   II.  ROA  and  LATD  
have  decreased  with  0.34  and  5.76  percent  respectively.  NPL,  EQTA  and  NLTA  have  increased  by  2.24,  
0.23   and   0.13   percent.   The   fact   that   CAR   has   increased   is   consistent   with   the   constrained   legal  
requirements   that   the   banks   have   been   obliged   to  meet   since   2007,   and   it  would   have   been   quite  
delusive   if   our   result   indicated   a   decrease   in   spite   of   this.   Thus,   it   is   relatively   remarkable   that   the  
increase   is   not   higher   than   2.18   percent.   We   expected   the   increase   to   be   greater   related   to   how  
comprehensive  the  new  legal  framework  of  Basel  II   is.      It  makes  sense  that  ROA  and  LATD  both  have  
decreased,   even   though   the   decrease   of   the   first-­‐named   is   highly   modest.   These   ratios   both   are  
dependent  on  the  liquidity  of  the  bank's  assets,  so  if  these  become  less  liquid  due  to  constraints  and  
higher  requirements  to  hold  assets  as  reserves  it  is  obvious  that  they  should  be  affected  in  a  negative  
direction.   The   high   increase   of   NPL,   which   is   a   measure   of   credit   risk   exposures,   is   most   likely   a  
consequence   of   the   financial   crisis   rather   than   Basel   II.   During   the   financial   crisis,  many   borrowers  
defaulted   to   fulfill   their   payment   obligations  which   affect   this   ratio   in   a  positive  way.  Harder   capital  
requirements  could  also  make  the  banks  more  risk-­‐averse,  with  the  consequence  that  banks  become  
more  restricted  in  the  control  of  their  creditors  compared  with  the  previous  period.  If  the  total  lending  
would  decrease  because  of  harder  control,  NPL  is  affected  in  a  positive  way.  Thus,  if  they  only  become  
more  restricted  regarding  which  borrowers  they  accept,  NPL  would  most  likely  decrease.    
  
The  regression  results  in  Table  8  present  three  significant  variables  which  all  affect  CAR  positively.  ROA  
is   in   line  with  ???????lvarci   ???? ?????????? ?????)   positive   result  which   tells   us   that   the   higher   the  
earnings  are  for  the  banks,  the  higher  the  CAR  should  be.  This  could  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  more  
capitalized  banks  can  issue  loans  at  a  lower  cost  and  might  be  more  selective  regarding  the  choice  of  
clients.   It   was   no   surprise   that   EQTA   has   a   positive   impact   on   CAR   when   the   equity   capital   is   one  
important   component   when   calculating   CAR.   This   can   state   that   if   banks   raise   their   equity   capital  
during  this  period,  they  can  be  more  resistant  against  credit  risk  related  failures.  LATD  is  also  positively  
related   to  CAR  which   can  arise   from   the   fact   that  higher   capital   regulations   force   the  banks   to  hold  
higher   levels  of  capital   reserves.  This  relation   is  also  showed   in   the  result  of  Ahmad,  Ariff  and  Skully  
(2008)  where  they  reach  the  conclusion  that  this  measure  is  positively  correlated  to  CAR.  We  also  got  
two  significant  interactions  terms,  the  variable  ROA_Basel2  show  a  negative  impact  on  the  dependent  
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variable.  Because  the  independent  variable  ROA  was  positively  correlated  to  CAR,  the  negative  sign  of  
the   interaction   term   indicate   that   as   capital   requirements   increased   due   to   the   implementation   of  
Basel   II   the  profitability  decrease.  This  result   is   logical  and  goes   in   line  with  the  fact  that  commercial  
banks   earn   the   major   part   of   their   revenue   on   money-­‐lending   business   operations.   If   the   legal  
requirements  force  the  banks  to  hold  higher  levels  of  reserves  relative  to  the  total  amount  of  emitted  
loans,   it   is  reasonable   to  assume  that   their  profitability  decreases.  The  second  significant   interaction  
term   is   LATD_Basel2.   This   variable   has   doubled   compared   to   the   period   before   Basel   II.   The   new  
regulations   regarding   capital   led   to  more  strict   rules  concerning   liquidity   reserves   in  banks.  Because  
these  are  in  the  numerator  of  LATD,  increased  liquid  assets  affect  this  measure  in  a  positive  way  both  
before  but  certainly  after  Basel  II  which  explain  the  large  increase.  
  
As  stated  in  the  beginning  of  this  analysis,  the  mean  value  of  CAR  has  increased  by  approximately  two  
percent.   This   average   increase   between   the   two   time   periods   can   be   an   indicator   that   the  
implementation  of  harder  capital  adequacy  regulation  is  efficient  in  the  European  banking  market.   In  
our  model,  an  increase  in  CAR  would  lead  to  a  higher  EQTA  and  LATD  for  the  European  banks  due  to  
the  signs  of  the  coefficients.  According  to  the  descriptive  statistics  this  is  not  the  case  for  LATD  which  
decreases.  This  fact  goes  against  our  model  and  indicates  that  the  chosen  banks  do  not  become  more  
liquid  with  harder  regulations  under  this  time  period.  EQTA  display  a  small  increase  which  goes  in  line  
with  our  expectations.  Higher   capital   regulations  would  most   likely   increase   the   solvency  position   in  
the   banks   with   a   higher   equity   capital.   The   interaction   term   ROA_Basel2   shows   that   after   the  
implementation  of  the  Basel  II  regulation  our  model  signifies  that  the  ROA  will  have  a  negative  relation  
to  CAR.  This  is  also  the  case  according  to  the  descriptive  statistics.  CAR  increases  between  the  two  time  
periods  and  ROA  decreases.  This  relationship  in  our  model  suggests  that  European  banks  increase  its  
capital  adequacy  because  of  the  new  regulation  at  the  cost  of  lower  profits.  NPL  and  LATD  which  are  
not  significant  in  our  regression  are  predicted  to  have  a  negative  relation  to  CAR  according  to  earlier  
studies.   The   descriptive   statistics   display   the   opposite  with   a  markedly   increase   in   NPL   and   a   small  
increase  in  NLTA  as  the  outcome.  These  are   indicators  that  the  European  banks  do  not  have  become  
less  risky  after  the  implementation  of  Basel  II  framework.  These  thoughts  about  the  Basel  II  regulations  
being   ineffective  can  explain   the   fact   that   the  Basel  Committee  started  to  work  on  a  new  regulation  
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It   is   of   importance   to   be   aware   of   the   restricted  width   of   this   thesis.   Our   results   could   have   been  
reached  by  reasons  others  than  the  ratios  used  in  the  regression  model.  One  of  the  main  arguments  
for   this   is   with   no   doubt   the   financial   crisis   which   began   approximately   one   year   after   the  
implementation  of  Basel  II,  and  especially  affected  the  banking  markets  worldwide.  This  makes  it  hard  
to  determine   if   the  effects   revealed   from  both  previous   studies  and   from  this   thesis   can  be  derived  
from  the  fact  that  Basel  II  was  implemented,  or  from  the  presence  of  the  global  financial  crisis.  The  big  
decline  in  the  US  capital  market  that  initiated,  what  today  is  known  as,  the  financial  crisis  spread  to  the  
European   financial   institutions   when   the   mortgage-­‐backed   securities   were   downgraded   in   credit  
rating.  A  big  liquidity  problem  occurred  in  the  European  banks  when  a  lot  of  banks  needed  to  borrow  
money  to  handle  their  obligations  but  very  few  banks  were  willing  to  lend  some  money.  This  problem  
in  banks  liquidity  could  have  affected  our  result  greatly.    
  
Other   components   could   have   affected   the   results,   and  with   the   FE  model   the   aim  was   to   capture  
those  that  could  be  derived  from  internal  firm-­‐specific  differences.  These  effects  could  differ  in  the  way  
the   banks   are   governed.   One   example   of   this   is   Asset   Management,   which   is   the   technique   of  
operating  and  diversifying  assets  within  the  company.  The  main  purpose  is  to  reach  a  gain  as  high  as  
possible  on  loans  and  other  activities  which  generate  profits,  and  at  the  same  time  hold  enough  liquid  
assets   to   handle   unexpected   losses.   Banks   do   want   as   high   returns   as   possible   but   at   the   lowest  
possible   risk   exposures.   This   is  made  by   an   accurate   selection   of   clients,   diversification   in   the   asset  
portfolio  and  of  finding  ways  to  raise  profits  from  the   liquid  assets.   The  way  of  doing  this  most   likely  
differs  between  different   banks.   The   results   could   also   have   been   affected  by   the   fact   that  we  only  
used  big,  commercial  banks  that  are  publicly  noted  on  European  stock  exchanges  and  thereby  owned  
and   controlled   by   its   shareholders.   Because   the   board   and   directorate   of   these   banks   are   highly  
affected  by   and  dependent  of   the  opinions  of   these   shareholders,   it   is  not  unreasonable   to   assume  
that   the   shareholders   might   have   an   impact   on   the   capital   decisions   together   with   the   legal  
requirements.  The  volatility  of  CAR,  measured  as  standard  deviation  (Table  3),  has  increased  after  the  
implementation  of  Basel  II.  The  standard  deviation  of  CAR  the  period  2003-­‐07  was  approximately  1.67  
percent,   and   increased   to   approximately   2.61   percent   the   period   2008-­‐12.   NPL   do   also   display   an  
increase  in  standard  deviation.  This  could  be  a  consequence  of  the  financial  crisis.  Higher  constraints  
with  the  aim  to  create  a  more  stable  and  less  volatile  banking  market  would  reasonably  decrease  the  
volatility.    This  is  not  the  case  in  our  calculations  which  indicate  that  the  financial  crisis  has  affected  the  




THE IMPACT OF BASEL II REGULATION IN THE 




Macro  factors  could  also   impact  our  result   in  the  regression.     Low  interest  rates   in  the  economy  can  
cause   a   decreasing   trend   in   saved   capital   and   raise   borrowing   in   the   society.   This   could   lead   to   an  
increase  in  our  dependent  variable  CAR,  because  when  banks  are  lending  more  they  might  be  able  to  
raise  the  profitability.  If  the  interest  rates  increase,  this  could  cause  an  increasing  risk  for  the  banks  if  
their  clients  cannot  fulfill  their  obligations  and  the  banks  are  facing  higher  cost  to  obtain  funds  and  this  
can   lead   to   insolvency.   Higher   inflation   could   create   a   lower   demand   for   credits   in   the   economy.   A  
lower  demand  for  loans  from  the  public  and  companies  could  lead  to  a  decrease  in  banks  profitability  
and  reduce  CAR  in  our  model.  The  business  cycle  can  also  have  an  impact  on  CAR.  During  a  boom  the  
????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
take  higher  charges  for  the  intermediation  of  capital  and  the  opposite  in  a  recession  when  demand  for  
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How  have  the  expanded  capital  requirements  of  Basel  II  affected  the  European  banking  market  and  its  
way  of  holding  capital  relative  to  its  risk?  
  
CAR  has   increased  with  approximately   two  percent  during   the   research  period.  CAR,   EQTA  and  ROA  
show   the   same   direction   in   the   descriptive   statistics   as   in   the   regression   model.   This   relationship  
indicates   that   the   expanded   capital   requirements   of   Basel   II   have   led   to   a   change   in   the   financial  
statements   of   the   selected   banks.   The   independent   variables   ROA,   EQTA,   LATD,   ROA_Basel2   and  
LATD_Basel2  does  all  show  a  statistically  significant  effect  on  CAR,  and  we  can  thence  reject  the  null  
hypothesis  at  a  five  percent   level   for  all  and  even  at  a  one  percent  significance   level   for   three  of  the  
five  variables.  Remaining  variables,  NPL,  NLTA,  NPL_Basel2,  EQTA_Basel2,  NLTA_Basel2  and  Basel2,  do  
not   indicate   a   significance   that   is   statistically   reliable.   Consequently,   they   do   not   seem   to   have   any  
significant  effect  on  CAR  and  we  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  for  these  variables.  
  
With  the  regression  model,  and  with  the  analysis  and  conclusions  drawn  from  the  result  of  this,  we  are  
able   to   answer   our   research   question   stated   in   the   beginning   of   this   thesis.   We   can   draw   the  
conclusion   that   when   the   legal   framework   Basel   I   was   replaced   by   Basel   II,   this   led   to   a   positive  
increase   in   the   capital   held   as   reserves   relative   to   risk-­‐weighted   assets.   Although   our   research   and  
result  can  display  an   increase,  this   increase   is  more  modest  compared  to  what  we  thought  when  we  
stated   our   research   question   and   began   this   thesis.   The   model   proves   that   Basel   II   has   had   a  
statistically   significant   effect   but   this   effect   is   in   reality   quite   unpretentious   related   to   how   big   and  
expensive  the   implementation  process  has  been.  This  could  be  the  reason  why  Basel   III  at  present   is  
ready  to  be  implemented  as  a  further  enlargement  to  Basel  I  and  Basel  II.  Hopefully,  the  Basel  III  will  be  
more  well-­‐turned-­‐out  compared  to   its  predecessors.  We  selected  banks  from  six  European  countries  
with  well-­‐developed  banking  systems,  and  did  a  FE  regression  analysis  to  eliminate  that  bank-­‐specific  
difference  would  affect  the  result  as  much  as  possible.  We  are  aware  of  the  limitations  of  our  thesis,  
and  the  fact  that  the  Global  Financial  Crisis  that  led  to  a  global  recession  might  have  had  an  impact  on  
the  financial  statements  of  the  banks  and  therefore  on  the  financial  ratios  used  in  this  thesis.  Hence,  
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Independent  variable     Sign     Reject  null  hypothesis     Significance  level    
ROA    
  
+   Yes     5%  
NPL  
  
-­‐   No     -­‐  
EQTA  
  
+   Yes     1%  
NLTA  
  
-­‐   No     -­‐  
LATD  
  
+   Yes     1%  
ROA_Basel2   -­‐   Yes     1%  
NPL_Basel2   +   No     -­‐  
EQTA_Basel2   -­‐   No     -­‐  
NLTA_Basel2   +   No     -­‐  
LATD_Basel2   +   Yes     5%  
Basel2        +   No     -­‐  
Table  9.  Summary  result  of  the  Robust  FE  hypothesis  testing  
  
  
6.1 Suggestions for further studies 
  
As  a  suggestion  for  further  studies,  it  would  be  interesting  to  add  several  independent  variables  to  the  
regression  model  to  see  if  this  would  generate  a  different  result.  One  restriction  is  that  our  model  does  
not  contain  any  macro  variables.   It  would   therefore  be  of   interest   to  expand   the  model  with  a  GDP  
index,  a  stock  index  or  an  interest  rate  to  see  how  these  are  correlated  with  the  capital  adequacy  ratio.  
A  further  suggestion  would  be  to  either  include  several  banks  or  several  years  to  get  a  greater  sample.    
We  chose  the  time  period  2003-­‐2012  due  to  restrictions  on  the  data  available  but   there  might  exist  
other  data  bases  that  contain  financial  data  from  additional  years.  All  the  banks  used  in  our  sample  are  
among  the  biggest  in  their  country,  so  it  would  also  be  interesting  to  do  a  comparison  between  these  
big  banks  and  smaller  banks  in  the  same  countries.    
  
At  the  time  of  writing,  The  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  has  started  the  implementation  of  
the   new   Basel   III.   This   will   likely   be   fully   implemented   in   a   couple   of   years,   so   it   would   be   truly  
interesting  to  see   if  the  effect  of  these  regulations  will  have  a  greater   impact  on  the  banking  market  
than  our  study  showed  that  Basel  II  has  had.    
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Appendix 1. OLS regression  
 
This  appendix  presents  the  full  SPSS  outcome  of  the  OLS  regression.  We  tested  for  eleven  different  
variables  and  their  impact  on  the  dependent  variable  CAR.  In  our  analysis,  the  focus  lay  on  R-­‐Squared,  




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression ,044 11 ,004 9,245 ,000b 
Residual ,092 212 ,000   




Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) ,098 ,016  5,975 ,000 
ROA 12-03 1,286 ,722 ,235 1,780 ,076 
NPL 12-03 ,195 ,120 ,220 1,631 ,104 
EQTA 12-03 -,012 ,193 -,007 -,061 ,951 
NLTA 12-03 -,012 ,021 -,086 -,566 ,572 
LATD 12-03 ,025 ,023 ,135 1,103 ,271 
Basel 2 (dummy) ,007 ,022 ,142 ,314 ,754 
ROA_Basel2 -1,850 ,893 -,257 -2,072 ,039 
NPL_Basel2 -,211 ,151 -,270 -1,398 ,164 
EQTA_Basel2 ,357 ,272 ,375 1,313 ,191 
NLTA_Basel2 -,004 ,029 -,048 -,145 ,884 
LATD_Basel2 ,061 ,038 ,359 1,606 ,110 




Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
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Appendix 2. FE regression 
  
The  tables  below  show  the  full  result  of  our  FE  regression  where  all  the  banks  dummy  variables  were  
added.  The  specific  bank  dummy  coefficient  is  not  interpreted  in  our  analysis  as  they  are  present  just  
to  capture  differences  among  the  banks  and  not  over  time  (Stock,  Watson  2007:356).   In  our  analysis  
part,  we  focused  on  R-­‐Squared,  F-­‐statistics,  B  coefficients,  t-­‐value  and  the  significance  level  (p-­‐value).  
  
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression ,100 34 ,003 15,466 ,000b 
Residual ,036 189 ,000   
Total ,135 223    
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Appendix 3. Robust FE Regression 
 
This  table  shows  the  full  outcome  of  the  robust  estimated  FE  regression.  This   is  made  to  handle  the  
problem  of  heteroskedasticity   in  the  model.  The  slope  coefficients  are  the  same  as   in  the  normal  FE  
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Appendix 4. Scatter plot  
 
The  scatter  plot  from  the  outcome  in  SPSS,  with  the  Standardized  residual  in  our  OLS  regression  on  the  
y-­‐axes  and  the  Standardized  Predicted  value  of  the  regression  on  the  x-­‐axes,  indicates  that  there  is  no  
constant  variance  between  the  data  points.  This  is  an  indicator  of  heteroskedasticity  in  our  regression  
model  (Wooldridge  2009:264-­‐265).    
  
  
  
